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Abstract—Validating a blockchain incurs heavy computation,
communication, and storage costs. As a result, clients with
limited resources, called light nodes, cannot verify transac-
tions independently and must trust full nodes, making them
vulnerable to security attacks. Motivated by this problem, we
ask a fundamental question: can light nodes securely validate
without any full nodes? We answer affirmatively by proposing
CoVer, a decentralized protocol that allows a group of light
nodes to collaboratively verify blocks even under a dishonest
majority, achieving the same level of security for block valida-
tion as full nodes while only requiring a fraction of the work.
In particular, work per node scales down proportionally with
the number of participants (up to a log factor), resulting in
computation, communication, and storage requirements that
are sublinear in block size. Our main contributions are light-
node-only protocols for fraud proofs and data availability.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Blockchain participants that independently validate and
store all the blocks are called full nodes and are vital to
the security of the network. However, as adoption of cryp-
tocurrencies grows, the burden of running a full node will
become infeasible for most users due to higher throughput,
causing more participants to operate as light nodes. Light
nodes or light clients, based on the simplified payment
verification (SPV) protocol proposed by Nakamoto [1], store
only block headers and do not validate transactions. As a
result, they cannot contribute to the security of the network
and are vulnerable to several security and privacy attacks
(see, e.g., [2, Chapter 6]). In particular, light nodes accept
the longest header chain, assuming that any invalid chain,
or a chain containing fraudulent transactions, will not be
mined upon. Therefore, in the status quo, their security
depends on the longest chain being valid, requiring the
strong assumption that the majority of miners are honest.
In [3], Al-Bassam et al. propose protocols for fraud
proofs and data availability, allowing light nodes to reject
headers of invalid blocks by receiving compact proofs of
their invalidity from full nodes. While block proposal proto-
cols still require an honest majority (e.g. to prevent forking-
based double spending attacks), they solve the verification
problem with an honest minority of full nodes. However,
the protocols still require each light node to be in commu-
nication with an honest full node, increasing the burden on
full nodes and limiting the protocol’s scalability.
Motivated by these challenges, we ask a fundamental
question: can light nodes securely validate without any
full nodes? Formally, we characterize a light node as
one that bears computation, communication, and storage
costs sublinear in block size. We answer affirmatively by
proposing a decentralized and permissionless light-node-
only Collaborative Verification protocol, called CoVer,
which enables a group of light nodes to collaboratively
validate blocks even under a dishonest majority, resulting
in the same level of security as full nodes.1 Furthermore,
the protocol is flexible in that participants can perform as
much or as little validation as they wish, with more active
participants contributing more to the security of the protocol.
The result is a blockchain network that accommodates and
utilizes the computing resources of participants of all sizes.
1.2. Overview
The key ingredients in CoVer are light-node-only proto-
cols for fraud proofs and data availability (see Fig. 1 for an
overview). At a high level, each node verifies a small part
of each block and broadcasts a fraud proof, i.e. a proof of
block invalidity, for any invalid transaction. A node rejects
the block if it receives a valid fraud proof and accepts it
otherwise. Then, the protocol is secure as long as each
transaction is validated by at least one honest participant.
To realize this idea, we propose protocols to solve the
following three challenges. The first challenge is that light
nodes should be able to validate individual transactions
without needing to process the whole block or store the
entire state. We overcome this challenge by proposing a new
block structure and fraud proof protocol (Section 2).
The second challenge is to guarantee data availabil-
ity [3]: if a miner includes an invalid transaction in the
Merkle root of the block but does not make this transaction
available for download, then no node can produce a fraud
1. Like [3] and [4], we restrict our attention to block verification and
not block proposal. Forking-based double spending attacks are still possible
with a dishonest majority of miners.
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proof for it. Therefore, light nodes should accept a header
only if all of its transactions are available, and they must
check availability while only downloading a small amount of
data. To solve this problem, the protocol in [3] requires min-
ers to encode the block data using an erasure code. Then, to
hide any single transaction, a miner must prevent decoding
by either (1) hiding at least a constant fraction of the block,
in which case a light node can catch unavailability with
high probability by randomly sampling a constant number
of shares, or (2) constructing the coded data incorrectly,
in which case full nodes can produce proofs of coding
fraud. The bottleneck in this approach is decoding the block,
which is at least linear in block size and therefore infeasible
for light nodes. We address this challenge by proposing a
secure collaborative decoding protocol on top of the recently
proposed LDPC-coded Merkle tree [4] (Section 3).
The third challenge is that light nodes cannot download
the entire block. To address this challenge, we propose
and analyze a simple modification of the gossip protocol,
deemed selective broadcast, in which nodes only gossip the
data that they need (Section 4).
Together, these protocols empower a group of light
nodes to collaboratively validate a block with each node
performing only a small amount of work, i.e. computation,
communication, and storage. Specifically, if each block
has L transactions and there are Nh honest light nodes,
each light node performs O˜(L/Nh) work, where O˜ denotes
equivalence up to log factors. Due to the connectivity re-
quired for the selective broadcast communication scheme,
this savings factor is capped at
√
L, resulting in O˜(
√
L)
work per node for large validation pools.2 These protocols
are also decentralized and permissionless while requiring
only an honest minority. Table 1 summarizes the properties
of CoVer while comparing it to other approaches.
1.3. Problem Setup and Objectives
System Model: We consider two types of nodes:
1) Miners: nodes that produce and broadcast new blocks.
2) Validators: nodes that validate new blocks. We also
refer to validators as participants.
We assume that all participants are light nodes. Specifically,
we model a light node as a node having computation,
communication, and storage capabilities sublinear in the size
of each block. We note, however, that nodes with higher
capacity can also participate in the protocol. For example,
a node with twice the capability of a normal light node can
act as two light nodes and perform twice the work.
We assume bounded network delay such that if a node
sends a message, it can be received by all other nodes
connected to the sender within some maximum delay ∆. For
analysis, we model the connectivity between honest nodes
as an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph, where each pair of nodes
is connected independently with some probability p [5]. This
connection probability is a parameter of the protocol, and
2. This ceiling can be bypassed by alternate communication schemes
that may be possible given stronger assumptions.
Figure 1. An overview of CoVer. We consider a network with miners, i.e.
block producers, and light node validators, which perform computation,
communication and storage sublinear in block size. The key ingredients
are light-node-only protocols for data availability and fraud proofs.
we analyze the required connectivity in Section 5. We make
no assumptions on the connectivity of dishonest nodes.
Threat Model: We assume that any nodes can be dishonest
and act adversarially. Dishonest nodes may deviate from
the protocol in arbitrary manner and may collude with each
other. Further, we assume that dishonest nodes can perform
any polynomial-time computations but cannot invert hash
functions. We require an honest minority, meaning that for
the protocol to function, there must be honest participants
doing enough work such that every transaction in a block is
validated by at least one participant. The required minimum
number is analyzed in Section 5. Like [3], we only solve
verification. Forking-based double spending attacks are still
possible with a dishonest majority of miners.
Objectives: In every round, a miner produces a block and
broadcasts the block along with its header. A malicious
miner may only broadcast subset of its data. Then, each
participant executes the protocol and chooses to either ac-
cept or reject the block. The protocol should be
1) Correct: all participants accept the block if and only if
a) The block is valid (contains only valid transactions).
b) The block is available, meaning that the miner
broadcasted enough of the block data such that all
of the data can be decoded (see Section 3).
2) Light-node-only: each participant performs computa-
tion, communication, and storage sublinear in the num-
ber of transactions in the incoming block.
3) Permissionless: nodes can freely join and leave.
4) Decentralized: the requirements of the protocol should
be uniform over all participants.
5) Secure under honest minority: for block verification,
the number of honest participants required for the
protocol to be correct should not depend on the number
of total participants.
We require correctness only with high probability, rather
than in the worst case. We will use λ to denote a security
parameter such that correctness holds with probability at
least (1 − e−λ). The specific high probability expressions
are calculated in the correctness proofs (Section 5).
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF APPROACHES FOR LIGHT NODE SECURITY
Full node
computation
Full node
communication
Light client
computation
Light client
communication Light client storage Block size
Light client
security dependence
Status quo [1] O(L) O(L) O(1) O(1) O(T ) O(L)
Miners
(honest majority)
Fraud proofs [3] +
2D Reed Solomon [3]α
O(L logA) +
O(L1.5) O(L)
O(log(AL)) +
O(
√
L logL)
O(log(AL)) +
O(
√
L logL)
O(T ) +
O(
√
LT ) O(L)
Full nodes
(honest minority)
Fraud proofs [3] +
Coded Merkle Tree [4] O(L logA) O(L) O(log(AL)) O(log(AL)) O(T ) O(L)
Full nodes
(honest minority)
CoVer (this work) N/A N/A O
(
1
k
L logL
)
O(k logNh) O
(
T + 1
k
L logL
)
O(L logL)
Each other
(honest minority)
L: transactions per block, Nh: number of honest participants, A: total number of accounts, T : number of rounds, k: division of work parameter, capped at
logNh
Nh
We compare to the original fraud proofs with two versions of data availability, 2D Reed Solomon [3] and the coded Merkle tree [4].
αFor fraud proofs + 2D Reed Solomon, we split the costs into those due to validation of transactions (upper row) and data availability (lower row).
2. Collaborative Verification
2.1. Proposed Block Structure
To enable fraud proofs, Al-Bassam et al. [3] modify the
block to include the root of a sparse Merkle tree that con-
tains the state (UTXOs or account balances). However, this
approach does not accommodate light clients because the
state cannot be divided. Therefore, we propose an alternate
block structure and fraud proof protocol. First, as usual, the
header of the i-th block, denoted header(i), contains:
• prevHash: hash of the previous block.
• root: root of the Merkle tree containing transactions.
• len: number of transactions.
• other: other data (like the nonce for proof-of-work).
We will denote the Merkle proof of the transaction txn
in block i as proof(txn → header(i).root). Next, as
usual, each transaction txn in block i contains:
• txid: transaction id (e.g., 32 byte transaction hash)
• sender: the id (e.g., public key) of the sender.
• signature: the sender’s signature.
• outputs: a list of transaction outputs, numbered
1, 2, ..., which specify the recipient and the amount.
To enable fraud proofs (see Section 2.2), we require that
each transaction reference and provide Merkle proofs for
the UTXOs (unspent transaction outputs) that fund it:
• inputs: a list of past TXOs (txid, j), i.e. the jth
output of txntxid, where the sender received money.
• inputProofs: for each (txid, j) in inputs, a
Merkle proof linking each input to the root in some
past header(k) in the chain, where k < i.
Given this block structure, a transaction is valid if
1) The signature is valid.
2) The sum of inputs equals the sum of outputs.3
3) The input Merkle proofs are valid.
4) The corresponding TXOs are unspent.
Any node can check (1)-(3) with just the header chain,
but checking (4) requires some knowledge of the current
state, i.e. some representation of the transaction history.
3. If the inputs are greater, the sender can send herself the change. For
simplicity, we do not consider transaction fees.
For our protocol, validators store the state as a hash ta-
ble spentTXOs mapping the IDs of spent TXOs to the
transaction that spent it, along with a Merkle proof of that
transaction to enable fraud proofs (see Section 2.2).
Assuming that each transaction has a constant number
of outputs, after T blocks with L transactions per block,
the size of this table will be O(TL logL). We will reduce
the size of this table by removing the dependence on T in
Section 2.4, and we will further reduce to O((L/k) logL)
by dividing the work among the participants in Section 2.3.
Then, a node can validate txn in block i as follows:
is_valid_txn(txn,spentTXOs) ∈ {True,False}
1: Check if the signature is valid.
2: Check that sum of inputs equals sum of outputs.
3: Check that the inputProofs are valid.
4: Check for double payment: check that each TXO in
inputs is not in the table spentTXOs.
5: If any check fails, return False and broadcast a
fraudProof, as described in the following section.
6: If all checks succeed, return True.
If the block is valid, then for each txn, a node can update
its state storage by including the spent TXOs as follows:
update_state(txn,spentTXOs)
1: For each (txid, j) in inputs, insert the entry
(txid, j) : (txn,proof(txn  header(i).root))
into the hash table spentTXOs.
2.2. CoVer Fraud Proofs
If a transaction in the block is invalid, then a validator
can produce a fraud proof, which proves that the block
contains an invalid transaction and can be checked by any
node storing the header chain. A fraudProof contains:
• invalidTxn: the invalid transaction.
• invalidTxnProof: the Merkle proof to header i.
• pastTxn: if the transaction is invalid due to double
spending, the proof contains a past transaction from the
same spender with at least one colliding input.
• pastTxnProof: the Merkle proof to some past
header k, where k < i.
Figure 2. Collaborative verification using fraud proofs. Each light node will
verify roughly 1/k fraction of each block on average. Honest light nodes
generate fraud proofs for any invalid transactions that they verify. Every
invalid transaction will be caught with a fraud proof as long as each of the
k sections is covered (i.e., validated) by at least one honest participant.
Then, any recipient can check the fraud proof as follows:
is_valid_fraudProof(fraudProof) ∈ {T,F}
1: Check invalidTxnProof and pastTxnProof. If
either proof is invalid, return False.
2: Perform the first three checks of
is_valid_txn(invalidTxn, •). If any check
fails, then the transaction is invalid, so return True.
3: Check for double spending: if the intersection
invalidTxn.inputs ∩ pastTxn.inputs is
non-empty, then return True.
4: Otherwise, return False.
Assuming that the number of inputs and outputs is
constant and hash table lookup is constant time, the heav-
iest computation is checking a constant number of Merkle
proofs, so the runtimes of is_valid_fraudProof and
is_valid_txn are both O(logL).
2.3. Collaborative Validation
Note that a node can verify a transaction as long as it
has the history of its sender, so a node can choose a segment
[a, b] of account numbers and only validate transactions sent
by those accounts.4 We will divide the account numbers into
k equal-sized sections and each node will choose one section
at random, resulting in the following protocol (see Fig. 2):
1) Download the header.
2) Download the transactions txn where txn.sender
is in the node’s chosen account section. The selective
downloading scheme is described in Section 4.
3) Validate the transactions and broadcast a
fraudProof if any is invalid.
4) Wait some fixed delay. Reject the block if you receive
a valid fraudProof, otherwise accept it.
5) If the block is accepted, update spentTXOs to include
the newly spent inputs for each txn.
Note that malicious nodes cannot generate fraud proofs
for valid transactions, and a single valid fraud proof is
sufficient to discard the block. Then, the scheme is secure
4. To facilitate partial validation, the transactions in a block should be
sorted by the sender’s account number. A “sorting fraud proof” would
contain two transactions that are out of order, plus their Merkle proofs.
as long as each of the k sections is covered by at least one
honest participant. We analyze the probability of coverage
in Section 5 and show that we need Nh > k(log k + λ)
honest nodes, each validating 1/kth of the block, to cover
the block with probability at least 1 − e−λ. Therefore, the
fraction 1/k of work required scales down proportionally
with the number Nh of honest nodes, up to a log factor.
Honest nodes with more resources can verify more than one
section, counting as multiple nodes in the calculation above.
2.4. Reducing State Storage and Switching Sections
One shortcoming of the above approach is that the
amount of storage grows linearly with the length of the
blockchain. Specifically, each node stores O(L/k) transac-
tions per block on average, each of which is size O(logL),
resulting in O(T Lk logL) storage after T rounds. To reduce
this storage, we add an expiration time inspired by [6],
where each transaction can only be spent up to τ blocks
after it is mined (note that the TXO owner can pay herself to
avoid expiration). Then, storage is reduced to O(τ Lk logL).
While each validator can choose to stick to one account
section forever, it may be desirable from a security perspec-
tive for validators to periodically switch sections, e.g. in the
case of slowly adaptive adversaries. Because TXOs are only
valid up to τ blocks after they are mined, two transactions
whose inputs intersect must be within τ − 1 blocks of each
other. Then, a validator can join a new section as follows:
1) For time steps t, t + 1, ..., t + (τ − 1), download the
transactions for the new section.
2) At time step t+τ , the validator now has enough history
to validate the new section.
3. Collaborative Data Availability Coding
3.1. Coding Structure
As described in Section 1.2, a fraud proof cannot be
produced for a hidden transaction, so light nodes must be
assured that the entire block is available without download-
ing the entire block. To solve this problem, known as data
availability, the high-level idea in [3] is to require miners
to encode their block with an erasure code. This idea is
improved in [4] via a coding scheme that combines Low-
Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes with Merkle trees.
First, we review the LDPC erasure code [7] [8]. Starting
with n data symbols, a rate-1/2 LDPC code produces n
additional coded symbols, resulting in 2n symbols total.
The code is specified by a set of parity equations, which
signify that some subset of the symbols sum to zero, and
can be represented by a bipartite graph with n left vertices
(symbols) and n − k right nodes (parity equations); see
Fig. 4. The code has the following properties:
1) Within the subclass of left- and right-regular LDPC
codes, each parity equation is connected to a constant
number dR of symbols, and each symbol is connected
to a constant number dL of parity equations.
Figure 3. The structure of a coded Merkle tree [4]. Each row is encoded
using a rate-1/2 code. Then, symbols are divided into groups of 4, and their
hashes are taken to produce the next level. The arrows denote a sub-tree,
starting from the 4 symbols sampled on the bottom layer. One possible
sampled subtree is denoted by the circled symbols, and some example
parities and symbols needed to decode this sampled subtree are boxed.
2) The code can decoded via peeling, which has time
complexity linear in the number of symbols:
a) Starting with some set of known symbols, our goal
is to recover the unknown symbols.
b) Find a singleton, or a parity equation containing
only one unknown symbol. Compute the value of
this symbol using the parity equation, and peel this
symbol by subtracting and removing it from each
parity equation it participates in.
c) Repeat until all the unknown symbols are decoded
(success), or there are no more singletons (failure).
3) A stopping set denotes a set of symbols that, if re-
moved, prevent peeling decoding from succeeding. It
is possible to construct an LDPC code such that the
size of the smallest stopping set is a constant fraction
f of the total number of symbols.
Next, we review the LDPC-coded Merkle tree [4] (see
Fig. 3). The lowest level contains the L transactions, which
are coded into 2L symbols via a rate-1/2 LDPC code. Then,
we take the hash of each symbol and group the hashes into
groups of 4 to produce the L/2 data symbols in the next
layer. We then code these L/2 data symbols into L symbols
using an LDPC code, and so on. As in a typical Merkle tree,
the Merkle proof for a symbol consists of its path to the root.
A key property of this structure is that after decoding the
`-th layer, the decoder has the hashes for the (`+1)-th layer,
which will be exploited in the protocols below.
3.2. Checking Availability
To make any symbol in the layer unavailable, the miner
must prevent peeling decoding from succeeding by hiding
a number of symbols that is at least the size of a stopping
set, which by the LDPC code is at least a constant fraction
f of the data. Leveraging this idea, a light node can check
for availability by randomly sampling c symbols from each
layer. If the miner has made a layer unavailable, then the
node will sample an unavailable symbol with probability at
least 1 − (1 − f)c, which decays quickly in c. Therefore,
each node samples c symbols for each of the logL layers,
along with their proofs to the root, and it accepts the data
as available if and only if it receives all of its sampled data,
resulting in O(c(logL)2) total data downloaded.
Figure 4. A graph depiction of an LDPC code with 3 data symbols and
3 coded symbols, represented by gray and white boxes. Each + circle
denotes a parity equation, which signifies that the attached symbols sum to
some known value, initially zero before peeling. After recursively peeling
singletons (right), the first and fourth symbols are known.
Using an interleaving approach in the tree struc-
ture, the amount of downloaded data can be reduced to
O(c logL) [4]. Specifically, a node first chooses c symbols
on the bottom layer. Then, it also downloads their paths
to the root, as well as any siblings of symbols on these
paths. The arrows in Figure 3 denote one such sampled
subtree. This subtree contains c randomly chosen symbols
from each layer, achieving the same sampling guarantees
as above. Furthermore, because the sampled symbols form
a subtree, each symbol’s path to the root and therefore its
Merkle proof is contained in the sampled data.
3.3. Classical Decoding
For the protocol above to function, however, the valida-
tors must have the capability to decode the block, otherwise
the miner can hide small parts of the block without the fear
that it will be decoded. We first review non-collaborative
decoding, as described in [4]. First, the miner revealing some
subset of the symbols along with Merkle proofs. Using these
revealed symbols, the node attempts to decode the remaining
symbols in the tree. We will decode layer by layer via
peeling, starting from the top of the tree. For each layer,
the decoding protocol should have the following properties:
1) If the set of hidden symbols contains a stopping set,
then peeling decoding will fail and the node will reject
the block as unavailable.
2) Otherwise, if there is coding fraud (at least one of
the parity equations does not sum to zero), then the
decoding procedure will produce a coding fraud proof.
3) Otherwise, decoding is successful.
The layered structure of the coded Merkle tree allows
one to catch coding fraud. Suppose that the codes for layers
1, ..., ` − 1 are valid, but there is coding fraud in layer `.
Because the node already decoded layer `− 1, it knows the
hash of each unknown symbol in layer `. Then, if the node
uses an invalid parity equation to decode a new symbol, the
hash of this new decoded symbol will not match the known
hash in layer `−1, allowing it to catch coding fraud. Using
this idea, a node can decode a layer as follows [4]:
decode_layer(knownSymbols,hashes)
1: While there are still unknown symbols,
• Look for a degree-one parity equation, i.e. an equa-
tion where all but one symbol are known.
• The unknown symbol is now known. Check that its
hash matches the known hash in hashes. If the
hash matches, add the symbol to knownSymbols.
• Otherwise, stop and produce a coding fraud proof.
• If there are no degree-one parity equations, stop and
reject the block as unavailable.
2: Once everything is decoded, check the parity equations
and make sure they sum to zero. If any equation does
not, stop and produce a coding fraud proof.
3: Otherwise, this layer is valid and has been decoded.
Then, a node can decode the entire tree as follows:
decode_tree()
1: For each layer `, keep track knownSymbols(`) and
their hashes hashes(`). Download as many symbols
as possible, and add each symbol with a valid Merkle
proof to knownSymbols(`).
2: Initialize hashes(1) to the root of the Merkle tree.
3: For layer ` = 1, 2, ..., dlogLe:
• Call decode_layer(knownSymbols(`),
hashes(`)), which produces hashes(`+ 1).
3.4. Coding Fraud Proofs
Suppose that after peeling some degree-one parity equa-
tion using symbols s1, ...sd−1, the decoded symbol sˆd has an
incorrect hash. Because this parity equation was the first to
fail, the d− 1 previously known symbols and the dth hash
are all valid, known, and have Merkle proofs to the root.
Then, a codingFraudProof contains the following:
• sˆd: the newly decoded incorrect symbol.
• hd: the committed hash of the d-th symbol.
• hashProof: the Merkle proof of the hash hd.
• s1, s2, ..., sd−1: the d−1 known symbols corresponding
to the parity-check equation for sˆd.
• symbolProofs: Merkle proofs of s1, s2, ..., sd−1.
is_valid_codingFraudProof(
codingFraudProof) ∈ {True,False}
1: The hashProof and symbolProofs are correct.
2: There is a parity equation involving these d symbols.
3: Decoding this parity equation results in the sˆd such that
0 = sˆd +
∑d−1
i=1 si.
4: The commitment is invalid, or hash (sˆd) 6= hd.
5: If any of the above checks are false, return False.
Otherwise, return True.
The coding fraud proof is size O(dR logL) from the dR
Merkle proofs, where dR (LDPC right degree) is constant.
3.5. Collaborative Decoding
To enable this protocol for light nodes, we propose a
collaborative decoding scheme. At a high level, decoding
follows the steps described above, but each node decodes
only a subtree of the entire tree. Every time a node decodes
a new symbol, it broadcasts it, allowing other nodes to use
it. Each broadcasted symbol must be accompanied by a
Merkle proof so that malicious nodes cannot broadcast fake
symbols. Decoding succeeds as long as together, the honest
nodes cover the entire tree.
First, we describe the subtree version of
decode_layer, assuming the previous layer in the
subtree has already been decoded. Decoding layer `
involves the following sets:
• desiredSymbols(`): the layer ` symbols in the
subtree. Note that their Merkle proofs are contained
in previous layers of the subtree.
• knownDesiredSymbols(`): the subset of the de-
sired symbols that have been successfully decoded.
• hashes(`): the hashes of the desired symbols, which
are in knownDesiredSymbols(`− 1), or the pre-
vious layer of the subtree.
• neededParities(`): any parity equations attached
to at least one unknown desired symbol.
• neededSymbols(`): any symbol attached to a
needed parity equation.5
• knownNeededSymbols`: the subset of needed sym-
bols that are known, along with their Merkle proofs.
At a high level, each node’s job is to securely decode the
symbols in desiredSymbols(`), and it has stored their
hashes after decoding the previous layer. To accomplish this
job, the node needs to decode parities, so it downloads
the symbols in neededSymbols(`), depending on other
nodes to decode them. An example is shown in Figure 3.
To make the protocol secure, any downloaded symbols must
be accompanied by a Merkle proof, and the node also
broadcasts any symbol it decodes with an Merkle proof.
Specifically, decoding a layer proceeds as follows:
collab_decode_layer(hashes,
knownDesiredSymbols,
knownNeededSymbols)
1: While there are still unknown desired symbols,
• Look for a degree-one needed parity equation (all
but one symbol are in knownDesiredSymbols
or knownNeededSymbols).
• The newly decoded symbol is a desired symbol.
Check that its hash matches the known hash in
hashes. If the hash matches, add the symbol to
knownDesiredSymbols and broadcast it with
a Merkle proof. Otherwise, stop and produce a
codingFraudProof (see Section 3.4).
• Listen for any broadcasts of neededSymbols.
Check their Merkle proofs. If the Merkle proof
is valid, add the symbol and its proof to
knownNeededSymbols. Store the Merkle proof
in case it is needed for a codingFraudProof.
• If there are no degree-one parity equations, wait
some fixed delay. If there were no additional needed
5. Note that because the left and right degree of the LDPC
code are at most dL and dR, we have |neededSymbols| ≤
dRdL |desiredSymbols|, so the size of this set is not too big.
symbols broadcasted in this delay, stop and reject the
block as unavailable.
2: Once everything is decoded, check degree-zero needed
parity equations and make sure they sum to zero. If
any equation does not, produce a coding fraud proof.
3: Otherwise, this layer is valid and has been decoded.
We can decode an entire subtree by decoding each layer:
decode_subtree()
1: Choose a subtree of O(c logL) symbols, as described
in Section 3.2 and Figure 3. This subtree defines the
desiredSymbols(`), neededParities(`), and
neededSymbols(`) for each layer `.
2: Attempt to download any desired or needed
symbols from the network, along with their
Merkle proofs. Add each symbol with a valid
proof to knownDesiredSymbols(`) or
knownNeededSymbols(`), where ` is the layer that
the symbol belongs to.
3: For layer ` = 1, 2, ..., dlogLe,
• Decode using
collab_decode_layer(
knownDesiredSymbols`,
knownDesiredSymbols`−1,
knownNeededSymbols`).
• If decoding was unsuccessful, stop.
• Also listen for any codingFraudProof. If any is
valid, stop and reject the block.
Using similar calculations as Section 5, if there are at least
Nh >
L
c
(logL+ λ)
honest nodes, then the entire tree is covered with probability
at least (1− e−λ). Note that, as for validation, the fraction
c
L of work required scales down proportionally with Nh up
to a log factor. For simplicity, we can set c = L/k, such that
1/k-th of the block is sampled for validation and another
1/k-th is sampled for availability.
4. Selective Broadcast
Finally, because light nodes cannot download the entire
block, we adapt the conventional gossip protocol to enable
selective downloading. The conventional gossip protocol,
which we use for block headers and any fraud proofs,
proceeds as follows (see [9] for more details):
1) The starting node sends the message to all neighbors.
2) Each neighboring node does the following: if the node
has not already seen the message, it first validates the
message (e.g., checks if the fraud proof is valid). If the
message is valid, the node forwards the message to all
of its neighbors. If the message is invalid or has been
seen, the node ignores it.
Note that fake communication from malicious nodes are
mitigated by honest nodes only gossiping valid messages.
Other broadcasts, like ones involving symbols in the tree,
are only of interest to a subset of the nodes. To reduce com-
munication, we propose and analyze a simple modification
of the gossip protocol, called selective broadcast:
1) Each node chooses the symbols it is interested in and
informs its neighbors of these symbols.
2) A node only gossips each received symbol to neighbors
that are also interested in that symbol.
Then, the communication complexity per node is simply the
total size of the data it wishes to download, plus the initial
step of informing neighbors of desired symbols, which has
complexity linear in the number of neighbors. The protocol
is successful, meaning that every node receives the data
it wishes to download, as long as for each symbol, the
subgraph of nodes interested in that symbol is connected.
This property always holds if the network graph is fully
connected. While nodes would need many neighbors, the
only communication that scales with number of neighbors
is the initial information step. Because these messages are
relatively small, this communication is small compared to
the work needed to download, decode, and validate block
data, especially if the number of participants is small. There-
fore, it is reasonable with a small group of light nodes.
If the number of participants is large, then we can
reduce the connectivity. Under the simplifying assumption
that the graph is Erdo˝s-Re´nyi [5], we analyze the required
connectivity in Section 5 and find that each node should have
at least O (k logNh) neighbors, where 1/k is the fraction
of each block that each node downloads. In the case where
there are malicious nodes, these nodes can choose to ignore
all messages, increasing the amount of connectivity needed.
In this case, each honest node will need O
(
1
1−αk logNh
)
neighbors, where α is the fraction of malicious nodes.
This term, which represents the amount of communication
during the information step, is linear in k, which is exactly
the factor of work reduced. Therefore, choosing a savings
factor of k = O(
√
L) results in O(
√
L(logL + logNh))
computation, bandwidth, and storage.
5. Analysis of CoVer
In this section, we formally analyze CoVer; please see
the appendix for full proofs. Let each of the Nh honest
nodes choose a section out of k at random to validate, and
a random 1/kth to sample for availability. Let λ denote
the security parameter such that the protocol succeeds with
probability ≥ 1 − e−O(λ). First, we calculate the number
of nodes needed to cover every section with probability
≥ 1 − e−λ and find that we need Nh ≥ k(log k + λ).
Next, given that the block is unavailable, all honest nodes
sample at least one unavailable symbol with probability
≥ 1 − Nh(1 − f)L/k. Finally, we calculate connectivity
required for selective broadcast and find that if each node
has O(kλ logNh) neighbors, the success probability is at
least ≥ 1−4L (Nh8k )1−λ−4L exp(− Nh8(4k−1)). Putting these
results together via the union bound, we analyze correctness
and show that with high probability, all light nodes accept
the block if and only if all of its data is available for
download, and every included transaction is valid.
Theorem 5.1. CoVer satisfies the following:
1) If the block is valid and available, then all hon-
est participants will accept the block with probability
≥ 1− e−λ − 4L (Nh8k )1−λ − 4L exp(− Nh8(4k−1)).
2) If the block is unavailable, then all honest participants
will reject with probability ≥ 1−Nh(1− f)L/k.
3) If the block is invalid but available, then all honest
participants will reject the block with probability ≥
1− e−λ − 4L (Nh8k )1−λ − 4L exp(− Nh8(4k−1)).
6. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, CoVer is the first light-
node-only protocol for block validation. First, we briefly
survey works related to light node protocols. Light nodes,
or simplified payment verification (SPV) clients, were pro-
posed by Nakamoto in the original Bitcoin paper [1]. These
nodes only store block headers and perform no validation,
relying on full nodes for transaction membership proofs. As
a result, they are vulnerable to several privacy and security
attacks [2], and several works are aimed at improving their
privacy and security; see, e.g., [10]–[12]. Rather than im-
proving security, another line of work instead reduces the
light node computational burden even further by enabling
them to download only a sublinear (in the length of the
blockchain) number of block headers [13]–[15].
Several works focus on reducing the costs associated
with running a full node, especially storage costs [16]–[18]
and communication cost during bootstrap [6]. For sharded
blockchains, Polyshard [19] proposes a protocol for verifi-
cation functions that can be represented as polynomials.
Our work directly builds on top of recent work on fraud
proofs and data availability. In [3], Al-Bassam et al. propose
the ideas of fraud proofs and data availability, allowing light
nodes to receive compact proofs of block invalidity from full
nodes. While Al-Bassam et al. use 2D Reed Solomon codes
for data availability, Yu et al. [4] propose a new coding
scheme called the coded Merkle tree to further reduce the
coding fraud proof sizes and decoding complexity. While
these works require light nodes to rely on full nodes, our
main contribution is to remove this requirement through
light-node-only protocols.
7. Conclusion
We propose CoVer, a decentralized and permissionless
protocol that enables light nodes to collaboratively validate
blocks even under a dishonest majority, achieving the same
level of security as full nodes with a fraction of the work.
CoVer allows nodes of all sizes to contribute to network
security, bringing us closer to fully scalable blockchains and
enabling a new world of possibilities.
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Figure 5. A toy example of a graph associated with an LDPC code.
Figure 6. A toy example of the peeling decoder.
8. Appendix
8.1. LDPC Code Example
Consider a toy example for an LDPC code represented
using a graph shown in Fig. 5. The left nodes (called variable
nodes) correspond to codeword symbols, and the right nodes
(called check nodes) correspond to parity-check equations.
Suppose X0, X2, and X4 are erased. Let us see how they
can be recovered using the peeling decoder. It is an iterative
decoder. In each iteration, the decoder first finds a check
node that has only one neighbor erased. Then, it recovers
the value of the erased neighbor. For instance, in the first
iteration, the decoder finds that the first check node X0 +
X2+X4 has only X4 erased. It computes X4 = −(X0+X2).
We illustrate the process in Fig. 6.
8.2. Collaborative Coding Fraud Proof Example
Next, we provide an example of a coding fraud proof
produced during collaborative decoding. Decoding proceeds
layer by layer, starting from the top. Suppose we have the
following tree, where a light node is trying to decode the
third layer (layers below not shown):
Currently, the node is attempting to decode using the
parities (two of which are shown), but the one involving
symbols 6, 8, and 10 is invalid because the miner constructed
the code incorrectly. In other words, the parity does not sum
to zero, but the node is unaware of this error.
Note that because we are on layer 3, the node has stored
symbols 1, 2, 3 (the coded symbols can be discarded after
the layer is decoded). If this layer is decoded successfully,
then it will add symbols 6 and 7 to its storage. Decoding
will proceed as follows:
1) First, the node will peel symbol 10, check that its hash
matches the third hash in symbol 2, and then broadcast
it with a Merkle proof (which consists of symbols 10,
2, and 1).
2) Next, it will wait for symbols to be broadcasted with
a Merkle proof. Suppose symbol 8 is broadcasted and
the Merkle proof is valid.
3) Then, the node will attempt to use the red parity to
decode symbol 6. It will find that the resulting hash
does not match the first hash in symbol 2, so the red
parity is invalid.
4) The node will produce and broadcast a coding fraud
proof containing the following:
• sˆ6: the newly decoded symbol 6
• h6: the hash of symbol 6, which is the first quarter
of symbol 2.
• hashProof: the proof of h6, consisting of symbols
2 and 1.
• s8, s10: the other symbols in the parity, or symbols
8 and 10.
• symbolProofs: the Merkle proofs, or symbols 8,
3, and 1 and symbols 10, 2, and 1.
Other nodes will check the fraud proof, and find that all of
its Merkle proofs are correct and s8 + s10 + sˆ6 = 0, but
hash(sˆ6) 6= h6, so they will reject the block.
8.3. Transaction Fraud Proof Example
In this section, we provide a simple example of an
invalid transaction and the resulting fraud proof. Suppose
we have the following sequence of transactions:
Transaction 5 in block 8
txid 8:5
sender 10
signature sign(10)
outputs 1. $10 to account 8
2. $8 to account 3
inputs $18 from output 3 in txn5:2
inputProofs proof(txn5:2 → header(5).root)
Transaction 3 in block 9
txid 9:3
sender 8
signature sign(8)
outputs 1. $5 to account 4
2. $5 to account 8
inputs $10 from output 1 in txn8:5
inputProofs proof(txn8:5 → header(8).root)
Transaction 2 in block 10
txid 10:2
sender 8
signature sign(8)
outputs 1. $10 to account 3
inputs $10 from output 1 in txn8:5
inputProofs proof(txn8:5 → header(8).root)
In this case, block 10 in invalid because sender 8 is
trying to double-spend output 1 from transaction 8:5. Then,
when block 10 is broadcast, the light node validating
account 8 will catch the double spending attempt because
it will have transaction 9:3 in its stored history. Then,
it will produce and broadcast the following fraud proof.
Any recipient of this fraud proof will check that the two
transactions’ inputs collide and therefore reject block 10.
Fraud proof for transaction 2 in block 10
invalidTxn
txid 10:2
sender 8
signature sign(8)
outputs 1. $10 to account 3
inputs $10 from output 1 in txn8:5
inputProofs proof(txn8:5 → header(8).root)
invalidTxnProof proof(txn10:2 → header(10).root)
pastTxn
txid 9:3
sender 8
signature sign(8)
outputs 1. $5 to account 4
2. $5 to account 8
inputs $10 from output 1 in txn8:5
inputProofs proof(txn8:5 → header(8).root)
pastTxnProof proof(txn8:5 → header(8).root)
8.4. Collaborative Validation Coverage Analysis
Suppose that a block is divided into k sections, with
each honest node validating a single section. We wish to
analyze the probability that together, the honest nodes cover
the block.
Theorem 8.1. Suppose there are k sections and each of
the Nh participants chooses a section at random. Then, if
Nh ≥ k(log k + λ), all of the sections are covered with
probability at least 1− e−λ.
Proof. By the union bound,
Pr(all sections covered)
≥ 1− k
(
1− 1
k
)Nh
≥ 1− ke− 1kNh .
Choosing Nh ≥ k(log k + λ) results in the bound 1− e−λ.
8.5. Selective Broadcast Connectivity Analysis
We would like to analyze the probability that the selec-
tive broadcast procedure succeeds, meaning that every node
receives the data it wishes to download. We will represent
the connectivity between nodes as a graph.
Note that if a block has L transactions, then the coded
Merkle tree contains 2L+L+L/2 + ...+ 1 ≈ 4L symbols.
Let r = (L/k) logL4L denote the fraction of total symbols that
each node downloads, and let M denote the total number
of symbols.
Then, the procedure succeeds if for each of the M
symbols, the subgraph containing nodes interested in that
symbol is connected. The following theorem analyzes the
connectivity required for selective broadcast to succeed un-
der the simplifying assumption that the connectivity graph
is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph [5].
Theorem 8.2. Suppose we have a graph G(Nh, p) of nodes,
where each node is connected independently with probability
p. Also, suppose each node is colored with rM of M colors,
chosen uniformly at random. Then, for p ≥ 2λ log(rNh/2)rNh ,
all of the color subgraphs are connected with probability at
least 1−M(rNh/2)1−λ −M exp
(
− rNh8(1−r)
)
.
Proof. Note that each subgraph is also Erdo˝s-Re´nyi with
connection probability p. Then, the proof will proceed as
follows: first, we will produce a high-probability lower
bound on the number of nodes per subgraph. Letting
n denote this lower bound, we will then set p ≥
λ logn
n , which by standard G(n, p) arguments means that
Pr(subgraph disconnected) ≤ n1−λ. Finally, we will use
the union bound over subgraphs.
Note that the number of nodes per subgraph is
Binom(Nh, r), but the subgraphs are not independent of
each other. Then, to produce the lower bound on nodes per
subgraph, we will use the union bound combined with the
a sub-Gaussian bound for the Binomial:
Pr(for all subgraphs, # nodes ≥ rNh/2)
≥ 1−M Pr(Binom(Nh, r) ≤ rNh/2)
≥ 1−M exp
(
− r
2N2h/4
2Nhr(1− r)
)
= 1−M exp
(
− rNh
8(1− r)
)
Then, setting
p ≥ 2λ log(rNh/2)
rNh
,
the probability that all subgraphs are connected conditioned
on the high-probability lower bound is
Pr(all subgraphs connected | # nodes ≥ rNh/2)
≥ 1−M Pr(subgraph i disconnected | # nodes ≥ rNh/2)
≥ 1−M(rNh/2)1−λ,
so the overall probability by the union bound is
Pr(all subgraphs connected)
≥ 1−M(rNh/2)1−λ −M exp
(
− rNh
8(1− r)
)
.
While the theorem considered the honest subgraph, the
full graph is G(N, p), where N = Nh/(1− α) denotes the
total number of nodes with α denoting the malicious frac-
tion. Then, substituting r = (L/k) logL4L , each node should
have
pN =
2λ log(rNh/2)
rNh
Nh
1− α
= 8λk · 1
1− α
log
(
Nh logL
8k
)
logL
= O
((
1
1− α
)
k logNh
)
neighbors.
8.6. Collaborative Decoding Analysis
In this section, we analyze the correctness of the collab-
orative decoding protocol described in Section 3.5.
Theorem 8.3. Suppose that each selective broadcast
reaches the entire network. Also, suppose that each partici-
pant samples c logL symbols to decode, following the sam-
pling procedure in Section 3.2, and Nh ≥ (L/c)(logL+λ).
Then, the collaborative decoding procedure in Section 3.5
satisfies the following:
1) If the code is constructed correctly and the data is
available, i.e. no stopping set is hidden, then the nodes
decode all of the data with probability ≥ 1− e−λ.
2) If the data is unavailable, then all honest nodes reject
the block with probability ≥ 1−Nh(1− f)c, where f
is the size of the smallest stopping set.
3) If the data is available but the code is constructed
incorrectly, then all nodes receive a valid coding fraud
proof with probability ≥ 1− e−λ.
Proof. Recall that in the collaborative decoding protocol,
each participant chooses a subtree to decode. To decode this
subtree, it keeps track of any parity equations connected to
any symbols in the subtree, downloading any broadcasted
symbols in these parity equations. Each node broadcasts any
symbols it decoded, along with a Merkle proof.
First, let’s prove case (1). Suppose that each symbol in
the tree is covered by at least one honest participant. Also,
suppose that each selective broadcast reaches the entire
network. Note that because broadcasted symbols must be
accompanied by a Merkle proof, malicious nodes cannot
broadcast fake symbols. Next, if there is a degree one parity
equation at any point in the protocol, then by the coverage
condition, there will exist at least one honest node in charge
of decoding the last unknown symbol. By the protocol, this
node will have downloaded each of the other symbols in
the parity equation, so it will decode the final symbol and
broadcast it. Therefore, decoding proceeds exactly as in the
non-collaborative case, so it succeeds as long as no stopping
set is hidden. By Theorem 8.1, the coverage condition holds
with probability ≥ 1− e−λ.
To prove case (2), suppose that a stopping set is hidden
in at least one of the layers of the coded Merkle tree. Each
node samples c symbols at random from each layer. Then,
each node samples an unavailable share with probability ≥
1 − (1 − f)c. Therefore, by the union bound, every node
samples an unavailable share with probability ≥ 1−Nh(1−
f)c.
Finally, let’s prove case (3). Suppose that the code is
constructed incorrectly, meaning that there exists at least one
parity equation that does not sum to zero. By availability, we
can assume that eventually the entire data will be decoded.
Let’s assume both the coverage and selective broadcast
conditions. We split into two cases:
1) Suppose that during decoding, all parity equations
used to decode are correct, and invalid parities are
not used. Then, decoding will succeed and all of the
data will be revealed. After decoding, in step 2 of
collab_decode_layer (Section 3.5), each node
checks its parity equations to ensure that they sum to
zero. By coverage, at least one node will check the
invalid parity equation and broadcast a coding fraud
proof.
2) Otherwise, suppose that in the process of decoding, at
least one invalid parity equation is used. Let’s consider
the time at which the first invalid parity equation is
decoded. Because this parity equation is the first in-
valid one, all symbols decoded until now are correct,
meaning that they match the hash commitments. When
the invalid parity equation is decoded, it must be degree
one. In particular, if the equation sums to K 6= 0, we
have the equation
0 6= K = sd +
d−1∑
i=1
si,
where sd is the unknown symbol. When an honest node
decodes the unknown symbol, the resulting symbol is
sˆd = −
d−1∑
i=1
si 6= K −
d−1∑
i=1
si = sd.
Next, following the protocol, the node will check the
hash of sˆd. The true hash hash(sd) was decoded in
the previous layer, and it is correct because the current
parity equation is the first invalid one. Therefore, the
hashes will not match, or hash(sˆd) 6= hash(sd), so
the node will broadcast a coding fraud proof.
8.7. Security Analysis
In this section, we show the correctness of the protocol
as a whole. Let Nh denote the number of honest nodes,
L denote the number of transactions per block, 1/k denote
the fraction of each block that each participant validates, α
denote the fraction of malicious nodes, and λ denote the
security parameter.
Dividing the transactions into k sections, let each honest
participant validate one section at random following the
protocol in Section 2.3. Also, let each honest participant ran-
domly sample (L/k) logL symbols from the coded Merkle
tree to decode, as described in Section 3.2. Then, we assume
that the number of honest nodes is at least
Nh ≥ k(logL+ λ)
and the number of neighbors per node is at least
Neighbors per node ≥ 8λk · 1
1− α
log
(
Nh logL
8k
)
logL
,
where these expressions are derived from the conditions in
Sections 5, 5, and 5.
Theorem 8.4. Given the above setup, the protocol satisfies
the following:
1) If the block is valid and available, then all hon-
est participants will accept the block with probability
≥ 1− e−λ − 4L (Nh8k )1−λ − 4L exp(− Nh8(4k−1)).
2) If the block is unavailable, then all honest participants
will reject the block with probability ≥ 1 − Nh(1 −
f)L/k.
3) If the block is invalid but available, then all honest
participants will reject the block with probability ≥
1− e−λ − 4L (Nh8k )1−λ − 4L exp(− Nh8(4k−1)).
Proof. Recall that by Theorem 8.1, all sections are validated
by at least one honest participant with probability ≥ 1−e−λ.
Also, by Theorem 8.2, and all selective broadcasts reach
the entire network with probability ≥ 1 − 4L (Nh8k )1−λ −
4L exp
(
− Nh8(4k−1)
)
.
First, we will prove case (1). The only reasons for a
participant to reject the block are (a) it receives a valid fraud
proof, (b) it receives a valid coding fraud proof, or (c) it is
unable to download or decode all of its sampled symbols.
(a) and (b) cannot occur because the block is valid, so there
do not exist valid fraud or coding fraud proofs. To show that
(c) cannot occur, let’s assume that each selective broadcast
reaches the entire network. Then, by case (1) of Theo-
rem 8.3, the collaborative decoding procedure succeeds and
all participants receive their sampled symbols with probabil-
ity ≥ 1−e−λ. So by the union bound, the selective broadcast
condition holds and collaborative decoding succeeds with
probability ≥ 1−e−λ−4L (Nh8k )1−λ−4L exp(− Nh8(4k−1)).
Next, case (2) follows directly from case (2) of Theo-
rem 8.3.
Finally, we will prove case (3). Let’s assume the selec-
tive broadcast condition. We will consider two cases.
First, suppose that the block contains an invalid trans-
action but not coding fraud. Then, by case (1) of The-
orem 5, the data is decoded successfully and each node
receives its desired data. Then, assuming that all sections
are validated by at least one honest participant, at least
one participant will validate the invalid transaction and
broadcast a fraud proof. Then, given that the network is
connected, all participants receive the fraud proof, validate
it, and reject the block. By the union bound, the selective
broadcast and coverage conditions hold with probability
≥ 1− e−λ − 4L (Nh8k )1−λ − 4L exp(− Nh8(4k−1)).
Otherwise, suppose that the block contains coding fraud.
Then, by case (3) of Theorem 5, all nodes receive a valid
coding fraud proof with probability ≥ 1 − e−λ, which is
the probability that each symbol in the tree is covered by at
least one honest participant. Then, the nodes will validate the
coding fraud proof and reject the block. By the union bound,
the selective broadcast and coverage conditions hold with
probability ≥ 1−e−λ−4L (Nh8k )1−λ−4L exp(− Nh8(4k−1)).
